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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

HARRY W. KIRCHGESTNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,

Case
No. 7370

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this brief we shall designate the parties as they
appeared in the trial court.
The appeal by the defendant is from a verdict and
judgment of $4,300.00 for injuries suffered by plaintiff
to his back while employed in interstate commerce by
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the defendant. This is an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Defendant gave to plaintiff a
mere $135.00 within ten days after the injuries were
suffered in settlement for these injuries. Defendant set
up this release as a bar to the action and plaintiff by his
reply alleged that the purported release had been entered into under ·a mutual mistake of fact.
It is to be noted that there are no matters presented
on this appeal which in any way affect defendant's liability for its violation of the Safety Appliance Act in
permitting one of its cars to be operated in interstate
commerce with a defective grab-iron. The evidence of
the existence of this defective grab-iron and the fact
that plaintiff fell and was injured is uncontradicted, and
although defendant makes some inferences in its brief
questioning the happening of the accident we will not
belabour the point but will only answer those things
which are directly raised by the defendant in its brief.
It is also to be noted that there is no contention
m·ade by defendant that the verdict is excessive in this
case and so it is established that the plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages in the sum of $4,300.00. In
connection with plaintiff's injuries defendant goes so far
as to accuse the plaintiff of being a malingerer. However, this matter was fully ~argued before and determined
by the jury and under the testimony of Dr. White it
appears without any question that plaintiff was sufferling at the time of trial from pains in his back which the
doctor was able to confirm by the existence of a muscle
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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spasn1 (R. 86, 92, 93) and that the plaintiff was not "putting on" (R. 86).
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The Statement of Facts made by the defendant in
this case is Yery brief and does not disclose in detail the
testimony and evidence introduced on the matters of
interest on this appeal. It is therefore necessary that
we make a more complete statement of the testimony
introduced in this case.
The plaintiff testified that in attempting to board
one of the cars of the train on which he was working
he took hold of the top rung of the ladder and that the
rung or grab-iron came loose from the car and he rolled
down the mountainside about 25 feet. He fell from the
car backwards. He struck his back against a boulder (R.
101). The fall stunned him but he got back up and
mounted the engine (R. 102). He continued to perform
his duties as brakeman for the balance of the night; he
thought he was "just kind of shook up and thought that
was about all there was to it." (R. 103.) His shins were
skinned. His injuries were received at 8:30 the night
of June 26, 1948, and he quit work at 11 :50 on that date
at Salida, Colorado. On the morning of June 27th his
back started bothering him and he described the condition as an ache in the small of his back (R. 104). He
then went down to the Rio Grande Hospital at Salida,
where he was examined by Dr. Smith and x-rays were
then taken. Dr. Smith stated that he could find nothing
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wrong with plaintiff and gave him some little pink pills.
Plaintiff did not report for work on the 27th of June
because he didn't feel like it. He at that time believed
he was just shaken up from the fall (R. 104). About
three or four days later he was examined by Dr. Hoover
or Dr. Fuller -at the same hospital in Salida and this
doctor stated that he thought he would be all right (R.
105).
Mr. Merrill, the trainmaster's clerk at Salida sent
plaintiff to Pueblo to see the defendant's Claim Agent,
M. V. Sayger. This was on the 6th day of July (R. 107).
Mr. Sayger had received information from the Trainmaster's office at Salida that plaintiff was coming to
see him. Before plaintiff arrived Mr. Sayger called the
hospital at Salida and talked with Dr. Fuller. He asked
the doctor whether or not plaintiff was "physically
qualified to return to work" and the doctor told him that
plaintiff was (R. 161). When plaintiff arrived he told
Mr. Sayger that he had come for a settleiPent of his
case and that he felt he was able to return to work (R.
163). There was no discussion as to the extent of his
injuries other than as could be implied from the fact
that both plaintiff and the claim agent believed plaintiff
was ready to go to work and was all right (R. 163).
There was a conflict in the testimony of Mr. Sayger and plaintiff concerning the manner in which the
$135.00 settlement was arrived at. In view of the jury
verdict, the testimony should be taken most favorably
to plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that after asking Sayger
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to settle up 'Yith him the two sat down and figured up
the time plaintiff had been off, which was ten days.
Plaintiff's daily wage was $12.54. Sayger stated that
would figure about $125.00 and plaintiff stated that he
would take $135.00, to which Sayger agreed, saying,
''You drive a hard bargain'' ( R. 181).
Plaintiff testified that he told Sayger that he felt
he could go back to work again and Sayger replied
"Okeh." Plaintiff testified that he believed he could go
back to work and that his injuries were over and that
this was the basis upon which he made the settlement
(R. 182).
Plaintiff testified that prior to the injury received
on June 26th his health had been good and he had never
been bothered with any pain in the area of his back (R.
140). During the month of July plaintiff was never relieved from the pain in his back. When he went back to
work in August his back still ached but he figured that
"it would come out of it all right now" (R. 108). During the time that plaintiff worked in August he stated
that every night when he would get in off the road the
pain in the small of his back would bother him severely.
He had a dull pain all the time but in the mornings when
he would start to work it did not bother him so much.
The severity of the pain increased when he got tired.
He described the pain after working all day as ''sharp,
shooting pains" (R. 109). He stated that when he was
not working for the railroad during the last half of
August that he stayed home and rested up and that this
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rest helped him (R. 111). He worked again from September 1st to September 26th but during this time he
still had the dull, aching pain in his back and it seemed
to remain about the same. He explained that because
of the pain in his back he doesn't believe he would have
been able to work unless he had had a good reason for
it and unless the conductor and other brakeman had performed about half of his work for him (R. 111).
Plaintiff was off work from the 26th day of September to the 27th of October and he then worked the
last five days in October and five days in November
until November 8th (R. 112).
During this period of time he had consulted with
Dr. Delahanty and Dr. Hines, the latter of whom had
prescribed a belt for his back (R. 114-15). The plaintiff
testified that his back ached continually (R. 116). Plaintiff explained that as a brakeman he was required to
stoop over for the purpose of coupling air hoses and to
line "dwarf" switches. He testified that this stooping
over caused pain in his back (R. 119-20). Climbing up
and down ladders and getting on and off of boxcars also
increased the pain in his back (R. 121).
The plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. White, could
only find one place in his back that appeared to have
any arthritic condition and stated that this was above
the point where the plaintiff's pain was located (R. 7980). However, the defendant's doctor, Dr. C. R. Fullel",
testified that from his examination and the x-rays which
he took it appeared that plaintiff had osteo-arthritis of
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all the vertebrae of his back (R. 171). Plaintiff's docto-:.·
testified that an injury to the bark might aggravate the
arthritic condition if any existed there and that the
healing process would probably be slower (R. 81).
The foregoing statement of facts presents the testimony in more detail than is contained in defendant's
brief and as we proceed with the argument we shall
quote from various material portions of the record.
SU~IMARY

OF ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
THAT THE RELEASE WAS ENTERED INTO BECAUSE
OF A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AND THE VERDICT
VOIDING THE RELEASE AS A BAR TO THIS ACTION IS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON PLAINTIFF TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE RELEASE UNDER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO COMSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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PENSATION FOR ALL PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT HE
WOULD PROBABLY ENDURE IN THE FUTURE.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY ro TREATMENT PRESCRIBED
BY DR. HINES.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO DIRECTIONS GIVEN HIM
BY DEFENDANT'S TRAINMASTER'S CLERK, MERRILL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
THAT THE RELEASE WAS ENTERED INTO BECAUSE
OF A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AND THE VERDIC'r
VOIDING THE RELEASE AS A BAR TO THIS ACTION IS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Defendant by its answer pleaded a release for
$135.00 as a bar to plaintiff's action. Plaintiff in his
reply alleged that the release had been entered into under
a mutual mistake of the parties. Defendant has at no
time until this present appeal raised the question of the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's reply. Facts sufficient to
avoid the release are therein alleged. Evidence relating
to the execution of the release and the issues of mutual
mistake were introduced in evidence without objection
of either side. The matter was fully presented to the
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court and jury. The defendant requested an instruction
setting forth its views of the law relating to the avoidance of the relea~e by mutual n1istake (See Defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 2, R. 34). This instruction
was adopted by the Court and given as the Court's Instruction :No. 6 (R. 39), and to which no exception was
taken. The only change made was that relating to the
degree of proof which forms the basis of defendant'~
second point in its brief, and which will be answered
hereafter. The Court's Instruction No. 6, as requested
by the defendant, with that one exception, is as follows
(R. 39):
"No. 6
"It is admitted that the plaintiff in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Thirty-five Dollars ($135.00) paid to him by the defendant executed and delivered to the defendant a written
release by the terms of which the plaintiff re-leased and discharged the defendant from all
liability on account of the accident and injuries
described in the plaintiff's complaint in this action. You are, therefore, instructed that the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this release was
executed under the belief of both plaintiff and
defendant that the plaintiff had recovered from
the injuries sustained by him in said accident and
that both he and the defendant were mistaken in
such belief. Unless the plaintiff has sustained this
burden your verdict must be in favor of the defendant."
We submit that this instruction was a correct statement of the law in its application to the issues of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case. We believe it conforms to the rule adopted by th~
Federal courts, a brief statement of which is found in
the case of Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, wherein the Court states:

"* * * One who attacks a settlement must bear
the burden of showing that the contract he has
made is tainted with invalidity, either by fraud
practiced upon him or by a mutual mistake under
which both parties acted. ''
See also Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F. 2d
942; St.eele v. Eriie R. Co., 54 F. 2d 688, 54 F. 2d 690
(Cert. den.) 285 U.S. 546.
There can be no dispute that this instruction constitutes the ·law of the case and certainly where defendant's request on the subject is given and no exception is
taken to the giving of such instruction, defendant cannot now claim the law is different than that expressed in
the instruction. We submit that under the testimony no
other verdict could have been rendered on the issue of
mutual mistake than a verdict in favor of plaintiff. If
the release was executed under the belief of both plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff had recovered from
the injuries sustained and they both were mistaken in
that belief, the release should then be set aside and the
verdict is supported by the evidence.
Plaintiff does not claim that there was any fraud
attached to the execution of this release but does claim
that both parties on the 6th day of July believed that
the plaintiff's injuries were such that he could return to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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work at that tiine and that his injuries would no Ionge r
prevent hin1 from discharging his duties as a brakeman.
As indicated in the statement of facts, plaintiff was sent
to Pueblo to see defendant's claim agent. He had at
that time been off work for ten days. Plaintiff's own
testimony on the occasion of the execution of this release is as follows (R. 181-82):
"A. I went in and introduced myself to Mr.
Sayger, right in the Pueblo depot down where
his office is.
Q. What did he say~
A. He said, 'I am glad to know you'. Acknowledged the introduction. And I said, 'Well,
Mr. Sayger, how about settling up with me~'
He said, 'Well, let's see what we can do.'
So we figured up day for day.
MR. BAGLEY: Just a moment. Tell us how
you figured, how you went about it. What was
said, just as near as you can.
A. Well, the rate of pay, I believe, is twelve
dollars and something a day. Twelve dollars and
something a day. Twelve fifty-four, I believe it
is, somewhere around there.
Mr. Sayger said, 'Well, that would figure you
about $125.00, wouldn't it~'
I s:aid, 'I will take one hundred thirty-five.'
And that was all there was to it.
Q. What did he say~
A. He said, 'You drive a hard bargain.'
Q. Was anything else said~
A. No sir. He wrote me out a check. I went
and cashed it and went on to Denver.
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Q. Was :anything said concerning you going
back to work
A. No, not that I recall. He asked me how I
felt. I said, 'I feel like I could go back to work
again'. And he said, 'Okeh '.

Did you believe you could go back to

Q.
work~

A. I did.
Q.

Did you feel that your injuries were overT

A. I did.
Q.

that

Is that the basis upon which you made

settlement~

A.

That is right."

The defendant's Claim Agent, M. V. Sayger, testified that he had learned from the Trainmaster's office
at Salida that plaintiff was coming to see him. In
preparation for this visit he had called Dr. Fuller and
in this connection Sayger testified (R. 161-62):

'' Q. And had you received any information
as to the extent ·of his injuries?
A. I knew nothing about his injuries, except
I had asked the doctor, after I received word
that he was coming, if he was physically qualified to return to work, and was informed that he
was.
When was it that you received this information 1
Q.

A. In the forenoon.
Q. That he was coming?
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of

A.

Of the day he arrived.

Q.

That would be the forenoon of the 6th

July~

A.

That is right.

Q. And you called what
A.

Doctor~

Dr. Fuller.

Q. Dr. Fuller. And he Is at the hospital
where~

A. Salida.

Q. And you asked him concerning any injuries that nfr. Kirchgestner, that the plaintiff was
suffering from~
A. No. I merely asked him if Mr. Kirchgestner was able to return to duty.

Q. And he told you that he

was~

A. That is right."
Regarding the information which he had at the time
of settlement, Sayger testified as follows (R. 162):
'' Q. And then all the information you had
before the plaintiff arrived, was that he was an
individual who had been in some way entitled to
some compensation from the railroad, and who
was now in physical condition that -he could return to work~

A.

That is !ight."
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Sayger knew that plaintiff was making the settlement under the belief that he was all right and ready
to go to work. In this regard he testified (R. 163):
"Q. And he told you, at that time, that he
was all over them, and everything was all right
with him~

A. He said he felt he was able to return to
work, but he wanted to go to Denver, then back
to Salida, and he would be ready to go to work,
his home being in Denver.

* * * * *
Q. Did you discuss his injuries with him?
A. Nothing any further than asked his condition, if he was able to return to work.
Q.

He said he was all right Y

A. He said he was all right.

Q. And ready to go to work?
A.

That is right."

We submit that the foregoing testimony is conclusive that both defendant's agent Sayger and the plaintiff made this settlement upon the belief that plaintiff's
injuries were at an end and that he was able at that time
to return to work. The evidence conclusively establishes
that plaintiff continued to suffer from the injuries he
had received on June 26th until the time of trial. The
night before the date of trial plaintiff was examined
by Dr. White (R. 76). The doctor found that plaintiff
did have pain in the region of the lumbar sacral junction, both on pressure and movement (R. 77).
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On cross-examination defendant's counsel attempted
to get the doctor to testify that the doctor had relied
entirely upon what the plaintiff told him in determining
whether or not pain was present. The doctor, however,
stated that from his examination he did not believe that
plaintiff was faking pain, and testified that he found a
muscle spasm in the area of the lumbar region of the
back (R. 85). The doctor testified (R. 86):

"Q. But in the case of Mr. Kirchgestner, you
couldn't tell whether that muscle spasm was voluntary or involuntary, could you~
A. Well, I would say that he impressed me,
during his examinationQ.

All right.

A. As being very cooperative, and not trying
to fool me, like some of them have tried in the
past, which usually they don't. But he was cooperative, and I don't believe that he was putting
on.
Q. He didn't have anything the matter with
him, did he!

A. Oh, I wouldn't say that. He had some
muscle spasm in his back which is giving him
pain.''
In describing the location of the pain, the doctor
testified (R. 89) :

"Q. I believe I asked you, Doctor, but you
ascribed this pain to a region lower than the region of this arthritis, did you not~
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A. That is where his muscle spasm is, is one
vertebra lower, :and on the lower portion of it.
Q. Yes. It is not in the vertebra where the
arthritic condition exists 1
A. Not when you palpate him and manipulate him, that isn't where he complains of it."

(

I

He further testified (R. 92, 93):
'' Q. And, of course, there is nothing in that
examination of the lower part of the back, the
muscle of that back, that would necessarily have
caused this man any pain, is there~

A. Yes. Yes, I am afraid there is. Whenever we find muscle spasm, which we do find in
his lower back, it is evidence that they are trying
to guard something, voluntarily or involuntarily,
and that is usually accepted as evidence of a painful condition in that region."
The doctor stated that plaintiff's pain was in the
region of the lumbosacral joint, i.e., the fifth lumbar and
first sacrum. He testified (R. 94):
'' Q. You didn't find any evidence of any injury to the muscle, or to the tissue, either, did
you1

A.

Yes, I did. ''

On recross-examination the doctor stated (R. 94,
95):
"Q. Do you feel that that muscle spasm indicated any pain that would prevent him from
working, carrying ori his duties as a brakeman 1
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A. Had this been a priYate case of mine, I
would haYe recommended conservative treatment
with some physiotherapy. In other words, not
having worked for maybe a matter of another two
or three months, during which time he would
have had that treatment; and I personally think
that would have been almost sufficient to help
him a lot so that he could have ''rorked. But he
hasn't had any of that treatment, from the story
he gives me, from October, anyway.
Q.

Dr.

Are you trying to answer my question,

White~

A. May I hear it again, please.
MR. BAGLEY: Will you read it to him?
(Reporter read last question.)
A. I would have to say yes."
As already indicated in the statement of facts
plaintiff testified that he has suffered with a dull ache
in his back ever since the injury and that in the discharge of his duties as a brakeman he was required to
stoop and to climb on and off cars and that this cause<i
pain in his back which became more severe the longer
he worked. He testified that he would have been unable
to perform the duties of a brakeman had he not had
the help of the men on the crew.
We submit that the foregoing testimony clearly
establishes that both the plaintiff and defendant were
mistaken when they concluded that plaintiff was all right
and was ready to return to work at the time the release
was signed and executed.
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Defendant, for the first time in all of these proceedings, contends on appeal that it was incumbent upon
plaintiff to tender defendant the $135.00 before he could
attack the validity of the release. At the close of the
case the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict,
basing that motion upon seven grounds. Each one of
the grounds related to the release. In no place did the
defendant in that motion mention the subject of tender,
its necessity or the fact that plaintiff had failed to mak~
a tender of the $135.00. Plaintiff's view on the law of
the avoidance of a release was given by the Court in
its Instruction No. 6. No statement or requirement was
therein set forth that plaintiff was under the necessity
of making a tender of the money paid to him pursuant
to the terms of the release. Defendant asserted the
validity of the release in its Answer and attempted to
uphold its validity at every stage of these proceedings.
We cannot help but wonder at defendant's good faith in
now stating a tender should have been made. For what
purpose? Merely for the purpose of permitting the defendant to refuse that tender~ This Court certainly will
not at this late date in these proceedings say that the
verdict of the jury must be reversed so that plaintiff
may perform the useless task of tendering to defendant
the sum of $135.00, which will certainly be rejected by
the defendant. This is merely a technicality grabbed at
by the defendant to save itself from the effects of a
lost cause.
The courts have had something to say on this matter
of tender and we believe that the cases clearly establish
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that defendant's position is absolutely untenable. The
courts have held that a defendant by its conduct in
asserting the right to hold plaintiff to his purported
bargain clearly shows an attitude that a tender would
be useless. The law does not require the doing of a
useless act. 1.11 errill v. Pike, 94 Minn. 186, 102 N. W. 393:
Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co., 123 Mo. 358, 27 S. W.
648, 25 L.R.A. 514, 45 Am. St. Rep. 556; St. Louis & S. F.
R. Co. v. Richards, 23 Okla. 256, 102 P. 92, 23 L.R.A.,
N.S., 1032; Woods v. ~Wikstrom, 67 Ore. 581, 135 P. 192;
Franklin v .. Webber, 93 Ore. 151, 182 P. 819.
In Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co., supra, the
court labeled a contention similar to the one made by
defendant here as a "sheer technicality."

In St. Louis & 8. F. R. Co. v. Richards, supra, the
court branded the requirement of a tender under facts
similar to those in the case at bar as an "empty, vain
ceremony.''
In Franklin v. Webber, supra, where the jury had
determined the issue of fraud in the procurement of the
release in favor of plaintiff, the court held that it would
be a profitless proceeding to return the case for a new
trial in order that defendant might have an opportunity
of refusing a tender of the consideration paid for the
release.
In Woods v .. Wikstrom, supra, the court stated (pp.
199-200 of 135 P.) :
"It is certain from the pleadings and the evidence in this case that if the plaintiff had tenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dered to the defendant the $30, either before or
after he begun this action, the defendant would
have refused to accept it. l-Ie obtained said release to be used as a defense to any action that
the plaintiff might bring for damages, and he
pleaded it as a separate defense, and relied on it
as a defense throughout the trial in the court
below. If the plaintiff had actually offered him
said sum as a tender, and he had accepted it as
such, said offer and the acceptance thereof would
have operated as a rescission of said release, and
he could not then have relied on the releas·e as a
defense. To tender him the $30, therefore, would
have been a vain thing, as manifestly, the offer
would have been rejected.''
The courts have also held that a failure to raise the
lack of tender in the trial court precludes the overthrow
of the verdict in the appellate court. Robertson v. F'ldler
Constr. Co., 115 Mo. App. 456, 92 S. W. 130; Mandeville
v. Jacobson, 122 Conn. 429, 189 Atl. 596.
The Court in the latter case stated:

'' * • * It is unnecessary to determine in the
instant case whether an allegation of tender was
required and the effect of the :absence of such an
allegation. As we have pointed out, the pleadings
did not raise any such question and, as far as
appears, no such point was raised at the trial and
there were no requests to charge m:ade of the
court. 'If a reply of fraud is made to a plea of
release, and no objection is at any time, by pleading or otherwise, made to the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's case for failure to tender or return
the fruits of such release, and the defendant insists on its validity :as a defense, he thereby waives
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the necessity for a tender, especially when the
fruits of a release are restored to him by the
judgment and there is no prejudicial error in the
omission to allege or prove an offer to retur:1
those benefits, even if such offer were otherwise
necessary to avoid the release.' 23 RCL 415;
Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co. (1894) 123 :Mo.
358, 27 S.\Y. ·648, 25 LRA 514, 517, 45 Am. St. Rep.
556 (supra). The charge as given was adapted to
the issues raised by the pleadings and sufficient
for the guidance of the jury, and the trial court
was not bound to instruct the jury as to a possible
defense which was not raised by the pleadings or
otherwise claimed at the trial.''
The courts have unanimously agreed that the defendant's rights are fully protected where deduction of
the consideration for the release is made and that no
reversible error is committed under such circumstances.

Franklin v. Webber, 93 Ore. 151, 182 P. 819; Marple v.
Minneapolis. <I; St. L. R. Co., 115 Minn. 262, 132 N. W.
333, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1082; Malmstrom v .. Northern P. R.
Co., 20 Wash. 195, 55 P. 38.
In Franklin v. Webber, supra, the court stated (p'.
822 of 182 P.):

'' * * * it is unnecessary to return or tender
the consideration paid for a release obtained by
fraud as a requisite of the maintenance of an
action for damages resulting from a personal injury, since it is sufficient if the amount received
upon the release is deducted from the verdict if
one ·is obtained. * * *''
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In Marple v·. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co., supra,
the Court stated:
'' * * * There are many cases in other states
which hold to the doctrine that substantial justice is secured and the spirit of the rule followed
where no return or offer to return is made in the
pleadings, but where the money received on the
settlement is deducted from the amount of the
recovery, in case there be a recovery for a greater
sum. Some cases hold this on the ground that
where plaintiff was entitled to the money irrespective of the contract, it is inequitable that he should
be required to pay it back as a condition of rescission; others, on the ground that equity will not
compel the doing of a useless act, and will not
permit a mere technicality to defeat justice. But
the real ground of all the cases, we think, is that
there is no reason for the strict application of
the rule when substantial justice can be meted out
in the final disposition of the case. * * * It is not
strictly logical to say that plaintiff was entitled
to retain the money paid because it was due him
by virtue of the original liability, because the
question of defendant's liability was not then
determined. But we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that it was not necessary for plaintiff to do
a useless act, that all that is required by equity is
that substantial justice be done, that this is done
when the amount received on the settlement is
credited on the verdict, and that it would be a
profitless proceeding to send this case back for a
new trial in order that defendant may have an
opportunity to refuse an offer of plaintiff to return the money received. The offer is nothing.
It is the actual return of the money received that
is the material thing. This has been done by the
verdict. * * * ''
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Defendant also argues that the mutual mistake even
if proven played no part in the for1nation of the contract
embodied in the release. "\Ye are at a loss to understand
how defendant can argue any such proposition. It conclusiv·ely appears that the plaintiff and defendant's claim
agent believed that plaintiff was able to return to work
and that he was all right. Certainly a question of fact
was presented to the jury by the evidence above quoted
and upon which the jury could determine that the parties to this release would not have settled an injury
worth $4,300.00 for $135.00.
We submit that under the evidence above indiqated
and upon the authorities herein cited that there was
conclusive evidence in the record to support the jury's
finding that the release was entered into under a mutual
mistake of fact and for that reason it should be held not
to bar the plaintiff's action.

POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON PLAINTIFF TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE RELEASE UNDER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.

Defendant, in its request on the subject of avoidance of the release, asked the court to instruct the jury
that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing mutual
mistake of fact by clear and convincing evidence. The
court struck out this requirement and instructed the
jury that the burden was upon plaintiff to prove the
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mutual mistake of fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant cites cases under this point of his
brief wherein the courts have stated that the degree of
proof in such cases is clear and convincing evidence.
However, none of those cases were cases in which instructions to the jury were considered. We have been
unable to find any case which holds that an instruction
requiring plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance

I

I

I
I

I
J

.1

of the evidence in a case such as the one at bar constitutes error, let alone prejudicial error.
In the case of Chicago &; N. W. Ry .. Co. v. Wilcox,
116 Fed. 913, the action was one in equity to set aside
the release and the court was not considering an instruction.
In the other two cases cited by defendant, Merwin

v. N. Y., N. H. &; H. R. Co., 62 F. (2d) 803, and Callen v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 162 F. (2d) 832, the courts
did not consider the giving of an instruction on the degree of proof and hence are not in point for the contention now made by the defendant.
A case in point, which sustains the action of the
trial judge in so instructing the jury, is the case of
Kansas City Southern Ry. Go. v. Sanford, 182 Ark. 484,
31 S. W. 2d 963, 966 (Writ of Certiorari denied in 283
U. S. 825, 75 L. Ed. 1439, 51 S. Ct. 3~7). That case was
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
to recover for personal injuries suffered by a railroad emSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ployee. The railroad relied upon a release to defeat
plaintiff's cause of action. The Court stated:
''The court submitted the foregoing question
to the jury under proper instructions, but on the
degree of proof required gave the following instruction: 'The jury are instructed that if they
find that the settlement entered into between the
plaintiff and defendant was not based upon raise
misrepresentation or mutual mistake, you will
find for the defendant, and the burden devolves
upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that such misrepresentations were
made or mutual mistake existed.' The appellant
earnestly insists that the giving of this instruction was error in that it authorized a verdict for
the plaintiff on a bare preponderance of the evidence, and that in this kind of a case it was not
sufficient for the plaintiff to establish his case by
mere preponderance of the evidence, but that the
jury should have been instructed that the burden
was upon the plaintiff to establish its allegations
of fraud or mistake 'by evidence clear, cogent
and convincing,' and relies upon the case of Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wilcox (C.C.A.) 116 F.
913, and the case of Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo.
233, 88 P. 221, to support its contention.
"It will be noted that the first-named case
was a suit in equity to cancel a written release,
and in that case the court held that a release
might not be rescinded for fraud or mistake
unless the evidence of fraud or mistake is clear,
unequivocal, and convincing. This is likewise
our rule in equity cases where fraud or mistake
is pleaded and affirmative relief sought. Ogletree v. Smith, 176 Ark. 597, 3 S.W. (2d) 683.
But the instant case is a suit at law and the aileSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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gation of fraud or mistake is defensive only,
no cancellation of the written instrument being
asked, but its consequence merely sought to be
avoided. The Wyoming case, supra, was an action
at law for a recovery of damages, and the defense of fraud or mistake was offered in avoidance of a release pleaded in bar to the cause of
action. In that case the court laid down the
clear perponderance rule, but we have been unable to find any support for this case, but think
the weight of authority and the decisions of
our own court are to the contrary. This view
is supported by the case of Capital Traction Co.
v. Sneed, 58 App. D. C. 141, 26 F. (~d) 296, page
303; Lumley v. Wabash Ry. Co. (C.C.A.) 76
F. 66; St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co.v. Phillips (C.C.A.)
66 F. 35, while in this state the mere perponderance rule has been uniformly given to juries
without any question raised and considered by
this court without criticism, and tacitly approved.
Industrial Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Thompson, 83
Ark. 575, 582, 104 S. W. 200, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1064, 119 Am. St. Rep. 149; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry.
Co. v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 614, 113 S. W. 803;
St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Carter, 93 Ark. 589,
594, 126 S. W. 99; F. Kiech Mfg. Co. v. James,
164 Ark. 137, 142, 2,61 S. W. 24; St. L. S. F. Co.
v. Cox, 171 Ark. 103, 283 S. W. 31; Sun Oil Co.
v. Hedge, 173 Ark. 729, 293 S. W. 9.
''In the case of Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v.
Montgomery, 164 Ark. 161, 261 S. W. 325, 329, the
issue was whether the maker of the note sued
on was induced to execute the same through
fraud and misrepresentation. In that case it
was argued that the burden of proof was on the
maker the same as if he was asking in equity to
rescind his contract and cancel the note. A number of cases were cited to sustain that view.
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In referring to those cases this court said : 'But
the rule in these cases, to wit, that before equity
will cancel, set aside, or reform a deed or instrument for fraud, the proof of the alleged fraud
must be clear, convincing, and unequivocal, has
no application to actions like this at law. Here
no affirmative relief of cancellation or reformation of an instrument is sought, but the defense is
simply that of nonliability because of deceit and
fraud in procuring the instrument which is the
foundation of the action. While fraud at law,
as well as in equity, is never to be presumed and
must be proved yet in actions at law one who has
the burden of proof to establish fraud meets
the requirements of the rule when he proves
the fraud only by a perponderance of the evidence.' "
The courts of Iowa have also held that it is unnecessary to instruct a jury in a civil case that a party must
prove a proposition by clear and convincing evidence.
In other words, such courts have held that the rule
which prevails in equity is not applicable to trials by
jury. See Holt v. Brown, 63 Ia. 319, 19 N. W. 235; McAnulty v. Seiok, 59 Ia. 586, 13 N. W. 743.
In Holt v. Brown, supra, the court stated:
"••*But it has been held that the rule which
prevails in equity is not applicable to trials
by jury • * *. In such actions the rule is that
the issue must be determined by a perponderance
of the evidence.''
We submit that instructing a jury that the evidence
must be clear and convincing would mean little or nothSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing to the jury. We have been unable to find any cases
where a failure or refusal to instruct on such degree of
proof has been held error.
The Utah court in Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co.
et al., 52 Utah 338, 173 Pac. 900, has indicated a tendency to place all civil matters upon a common basis
and all issues in a civil case should be presented to a
jury under instructions requiring the parties to prove
their respective contentions by a preponderance of the
evidence.

In any event we submit that the evidence established
without
under a
whether
to work

contradiction that the parties were laboring
mutual mistake of fact on the proposition of
or not the plaintiff was physically able to return
and as to the fact that plaintiff had recovered

from the effects of any injuries suffered by him on
June 26th. We refer to the discussion of the evidence
as set forth under Point I of this brief.
We submit that the defendant could not possibly
have been prejudiced even if error were present in this
instruction.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

Instruction No. 10 is quoted at length on page 21
of appellant's brief. By that instruction the jury was
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told that plaintiff was entitled to all damages, if any,
resulting from the defective grab-iron, even though his
injuries were more serious and of longer duration because of the preexisting arthritis to which the defendant's medical expert testified.
Defendant's criticism of this instruction is unrealistic. It claims that it concerns a subject upon which there
was no evidence and about which there was no issue.
Plaintiff had been in good health and had suffered no
back pains prior to his injury on June 26th. Since that
time he has continually been bothered with such pains,
the severity of which increased with stooping and
climbing off and on cars and when he becomes tired from
work. Plaintiff's medical expert testified that he found
evidence of arthritis on only one vertebra, that being
the fourth lumbar vertebra. His testimony in that regard is found at R. 79 and 80, wherein he testified:
"Now, the only thing that we notice abnormal
here is that on the top of this 4th lumbar vertebra there is a little bit of roughening. For instance, compare it with this 3rd lumbar vertabra,
and you see this is a little rough here, and a
little rounded at that end. That is evidence of
an osteo-arthritis involving his 4th lumbar vertebra. However, most of his pain is down a little
bit lower than that, which makes you think it
is soft tissue injury rather than bony injury
that is giving him his pain.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

Plaintiff's expert was then asked concerning the
effect which arthritis might have upon an injury and
he testified (R. 81):
'' Q. In your opinion, Doctor, could a condition of arthritis such as you observed in the
exhibits here, have been caused or created by
a blow in the nature of a fall in which a man
lands on his back~

A. Well, these pictures were taken in October,
and my recollection was his injury was in June. I
wouldn't want to go on record as saying that
would cause an ·arthritic process to develop in
that length of time. He may have had an arthritic process that was aggravated by his injury,
but to say the injury itself caused the arthritis,
I wouldn't want to say that.

Q. What effect does the presence of arthritis in a person's spine have on injury, or is
there a relationship there~
A. If a person with arthritis was injured,
he would probably be a little slower ~. gett~g
better; it might aggravate the arthritic thm~
so it would develop to a greater degree than It
would otherwise.''
Under the foregoing testimony when plaintiff rested
his case there had not been raised an issue as to the
effect that arthritis might have upon the injuries and
damage sustained by plaintiff. However, the defendant
in its case then introduced testimony through its medical
expert that the plaintiff's back was filled with arthritis.
We pause to ask the question, If defendant contended
nothing for this arthritic condition, why then did it inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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troduce such testimony in this case 1 The obvious answer
is that defendant used this testimony for the purpo3e
of attempting to impress on the jury both by evidence
and by argument that any trouble that plaintiff was
experiencing did not result from any injury suffered by
him. Defendant contended that if plaintiff suffered any
pain in his back it was due to an arthritic condition which
had been in existence for at least ten years prior to the
accident of June 26th. Defendant's medical expert had
examined the plaintiff at the hospital in Salida on July
5, 1948 and had taken x-rays of plaintiff's back. He testi:fied as follows (R. 171, 172):

'' Q. Will you explain to the jurors anything
unusual or abnormal about that spine, that you
can observe?
A. Well, yes sir. He has osteo-arthritis of
all of the vertabrae, including the lower dorsal
and all of the lumbar.

* * • * * * *
''Q. The arthritic condition you have pointed
to, on the different vertabrae is toward the front,
is it not?
A. Yes sir. This is towards the abdomen, towards the front.
Q. Do you notice any arthritic condition at
the surface of the spine as it surfaces near the
back?
A. You have this lipping of the body of the
vertebrae. You notice arthritic changes.
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Q. When you say 'the lipping', are you indicating the little points that grow out on the vertebrae~

A. No. These are the points. That is the
front surface. This is on the body of the vertebrae where, in between here, you have your pad
of cartilage. The lipping of this also so denotes
arthritis.
Q. In other words, there is an arthritic condition along that entire back~

A. Yes sir.

Q. In the area you have
A.

indicated~

Yes.''

This doctor testified that the fifth lumbar vertebra was
affected with arthritis (R. 174).
The defendant was very careful to point out that
this arthritic condition found in plaintiff's back was a
condition which had been present for a long period of
time. The doctor testified as follows (R. 175):
'' Q. I believe, Doctor, he was injured on the
26th of June, or claims to have been injured on
the 26th of June, which would be approximately
a little over a week before?

A.

Yes sir.

,Q. Would you say this arthritic condition
W~ICh you d~monstrated to the jurors existed
prior to the time he claimed he was injured~
A. Sure.
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Q. Could you give us an idea approximately
how far before he was injured this condition
existed?
A. Of course, I can't make an absolute statement on that. I presllllle it started ten years, at
least, before. That would be the supposition.

Q. In other words, Doctor, the condition you
have demonstrated to us in these x-rays is a condition which has grown in this man, and existed
probably ten years prior to the time he claims his
injuries t
A. Yes sir."
This medical expert also testified that he had come to
the conclusion that there was no injury to the bones of
the spine or to the lower back, and the doctor to bolster
his testimony told of a series of studies that were made
of backs of individuals coming in before him for examination. This study was made because of the numerous
complaints of low back pains of individuals. He testified that while he wouldn't say that the average person
over forty had back pains there were an awful lot of
them that did (R. 176, 177).
The effect of defendant's testimony was that there
was no injury to plaintiff's back and nothing wrong
with it other than an arthritic condition which had
existed for at least ten years. From this testimony defendant was able to argue and did argue that any pain
suffered by plaintiff was related solely to a back condition which had existed for a long time prior to the injuri~s of June 26th. This testimony, however, also had
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the effect of placing before the jury the proposition 0f
whether or not the arthritic condition and resulting pain
had been caused or aggravated by the fall suffered by
plaintiff. Because of the arthritic condition existing in
the back the jury could well have believed and determined that plaintiff's injury was of longer duration
than it otherwise would have been. Such conclusion anJ.
determination is justified by the testimony of Dr. White
above quoted to the effect that an arthritic condition
would probably result in slower healing.
The cases cited by the defendant under Point III
of its brief have nothing to do with the situation presented in the case at bar. They merely stand for the
general principle that it is error to submit an issue on
which there is no evidence.
In Tyng v. Constant Lorraine Investment Co., 37

Utah 304, 108 Pac. 1109, and in State Bank of Beaver

Cownty v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, the
courts had before them actions soundmg in contract.
In Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697, and

in Erie Railroad Co. v. Vajo, 41 F. · (2d) 738, the instructions were on the question of liabiilty in negligence
cases.
The defendant is in error when it states that there
was no issue made by the pleadings relative to an aggravation of a preexisting latent osteo-arthritic condition
of the back. In describing the injuries suffered by plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff due to the fall, in paragraph VIII, Subdiv. (b),
found at R. 3, plaintiff's complaint alleges:
'' (b) Severe shock and injury to the nervous
system, activating and aggravating a latent osteoarthritic condition of the back, hips, lumbar and
sacroiliac joints."
We submit that there was no error in instructing
the jucy that aggravation of a preexisting condition is
recoverable. Such aggravation could consist of either
greater pain or pain existing over a longer period of
time.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR ALL PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT HE
WOULD PROBABLY ENDURE IN THE FUTURE.

Defendant, under Point IV of its brief, contends
that the jury should have been instructed that plaintiff
was entitled to recover damages for only such future
pain and suffering as the evidence establishes with
reasonable certainty.
Defendant relies primarily upon the case of Chicago,
M. & St. P .. Ry. Co. v. Lindeman, 143 Fed. 946. This
case is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the
jury here was instructed that it could allow for only
such pain and suffering as plaintiff "will probably endure in the future." There was no such language contained in the instruction considered in the Lindeman
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case. There plaintiff was permitted to recover for pain
and suffering he "may in the future suffer."
The rule for future losses under the Federal Employers' Liability Act was raised in a much later case
in the United States Supreme Court, i.e., Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Carnaham,, 241 U.S. 241, 36 S. Ct. 594,595.
The second assignment of error by the railroad was that
the instruction complained of permitted a recovery in
damages not only for those that proximately resulted
from the injury, but also its effect upon the future which
involved a consideration of consequences which might
be essentially speculative and remote. The court had
before it for consideration the following instruction:
''The court instructs the jury that if they believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in this action then in assessing damages against the defendant, they may take into co~sider~tion the
pain and suffering of the plaintiff, his !llent~l
anguish, the bodily injury sustained by him, ~ts
pecuniary loss, his loss of power and capacity
for work and its effect upon his future, not however, in excess of $35,000, as to them may seem
just and fair.''
It will be noted that the Virginia Court, from whose
decision the railroad prosecuted its appeal, did not ·require the jury to find future pain and suffering by any
degree of proof, but only required them to find such
future pain and suffering by a preponderance of the
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evidence. The court then in discussing the Virginia
Court's decision stated as follows:
"The supreme court expressed the view that
the speculation of future results which the railway company professed to apprehend was not
left by the instruction for the jury to indulge,
nor did the instruction commit the amount of
damages to the conjecture of the jury independently of the evidence in the case. The contention
made here was explicitly rejected, viz., that the
instruction permitted the jury to take into consideration the 'possible future physical effects
from the injury, such as future suffering in the
absence of evidence as to the probability of such.'
The court remarked that it would be a strained
construction of the language of the instruction
'to hold that it referred to future suffering, and
that damages not the proximate result of the injuries received were included under' it, and that,
besides, such conclusion was precluded by an instruction given at the request of the railway company, which was 'that in order for the plaintiff
to recover in this case he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injuries he
sustained were the direct and proximate result
of the negligence of the defendant.'
"The comment of the court is accurate and we
can add nothing to it. The principle is established
that when the evidence in a case shows that there
will be future effects from an injury, an instruction which justifies an inclusion o,f them in an
award of damages is not error. Washington & G.
R. Co. v. Harmon (Washington & G. R. Co. v.
Tobriner), 147 U. S. 571, 37 L. Ed. 284, 13 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 557; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600,
50 L. Ed. 1162, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709.
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"It is also objected that the instruction 'allowed the jury to indulge in speculation and conjecture; invited their attention to the sum of
$35,000, and allowed the jury to give such sum as
damages as to them might 'seem just and fair'
without stating that the damages could be only
such as were proved by the evidence to have proximately resulted from the negligent act complained
of.'
"The objection is untenable. As we have seen,
the court explicitly enjoined upon the jury that
there must be a proximate and causal relation between the damages and the negligence of the company, and the reference to the sum of $35,000 was
a limitation of the amount stated in the declaration. There could have been no misunderstanding
of the purpose of the instruction. Norfolk & W.
R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 119, 57 L. Ed.
1096, 1100, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, Ann. Cas. 1914C,
172."
The instruction given to the jury in the case at bar
was an instruction which has been approved by this
Court in the case of Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 52
Utah 338, 173 P. 900, 901, 902. The same contention was
made by defendant in that case as is now made by the
defendant in the case at bar. The instruction considered
in the Picino case was as follows :
'' 'If, under the evidence and the instructions
given you by the court, your verdict is in favor
?f th~ plaintiff, you will assess ills damages, and
In doing so you have the right and should take
~nto consideration his age and his earning capacIty, before and after the injury the nature and
extent of his injury, and wheth~r permanent or
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not, the physical pain and mental anguish suffered and endured and that he will probably hereafter endure bY reason and on account of said
injury, the tim."e lost and that he will probably
hereafter lose, as may appear from the evidence,
by reason of and as a direct result of such injury,
such expense, if any, as he will hereafter incur in
the treatment of the injury, together with all the
facts and circumstances in evidence in the case,
and after doing so you will assess the damages at
such sum as from the evidence you may deem
proper, not exceeding the amount claimed by
plaintiff in his complaint.' "
The court stated defendant's contention as follows:
"In support of this assignment appellants concede that damages may be allowed in cases of
this kind for future pain and suffering and for
future loss of time; but they insist that the jury
should be limited in awarding the damages for
such future pain and suffering or loss of time ~s
is reasonably certain from the evidence the plaintiff will suffer in the future. They object to the
jury speculating as to the pain and suffering he
will probably hereafter endure and the time he
will probably hereafter lose * * *. ''
In answering defendant's contention the court
stated:

'' * * * The rule invoked by appellants calls
for a higher degree of certainty than is ordinarily
required in civil cases. It is quite true the jury
should not be permitted to indulge in mere speculation in endeavoring to determine the rights of
litigants. It does not follow, however, that be-
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cause they cannot demonstrate their conclusions
with mathematical precision that therefore? their
conclusions are invalid. Even in attempting to
determine the damages already sustained in cases
of this kind, jurors, in the very nature of things,
are confronted with more or less uncertainty.
That which is most likely, or that which is probable in the light of all the evidence, is oftentimes
the only practical guide. If a higher degree of
certainty than this is required, it is manifest that
great hardship and injustice will result in many
cases. Of course, the probability here referred to
should not be a mere conjectural probability, but
one based on evidence. The jury, whose duty it
is to ascertain and declare the truth from conflicting testimony, should accept that which is
probably true as against that which is less probable. In doing so the juror keeps within the law
applicable to civil cases. He should accept that
which he believes to be true, notwithstanding it
may be more or less uncertain.''
The court quoted from 8 R. C. L. at page 544 as
follows:
" 'It is a well-settled general rule that, in
assessing the amount of damages in an action
for a personal injury, the jury may make an allowance for the pain and suffering which the person
injured is reasonably certain to undergo in the
future in consequence of the injury, including also
an aiiowance for mental suffering. Pain and suffering which are merely possible and speculative
are, of course, not to be considered. All that is
required under this rule is that there be sufficient
evidence from which the jury may fairly derive
the conclusion that the chances that the plaintiff
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will endure future pain and suffering preponderate over those that he will not. Such preponderance denotes probability or likelihood, and that is
sufficient.' "
Referring to this latter authority and the many other
cases, including cases from the Federal courts, the Utah
Supreme Court concluded as follows :
''These authorities sustain the position of respondent. The doctrine they enunciate is in harmony with our own views and with the practice
generally which prevails in the trial of civil cases.
If jurors are made to understand that their con-clusions must be based upon substantial evidence
actually introduced (and they generally are so
instructed), we see no reason why a distinction
should be made as to the degree of certainty between a case of this kind and any other ordinary
civil case. Appellant's exception to the instruction is not sustained.''
Instructions which permit the jury to award damages for probable future pain and suffering have bee~
held not to allow the jury to give speculative damages
and that such instructions are proper and the words
''reasonably certain'' need not be used therein. See
Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295 P. 780; Gallamore v. City of Olympia, 43 Wash. 379, 75 P. 978. In this
latter case the Court in discussing the similarity between
the words "probable'' and "reasonably certain" stated
as follows:

" * * • The word 'probable' is defined in Webster's International Dictionary as 'having more
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j·

evidence for than against; supported by evidence
which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves
some room for doubt; likely'; and in common
acceptation the word implies, when applied to a
condition which may be supposed beforehand, that
we know facts enough about the condition sunposed to make us reasonably confident of it, or, ~t
the least, that the evidence preponderates in its
favor. In civil actions it is a general rule to
which there are but few exceptions, that the fury
may find according to the preponderance of the
evidence. We know of no reason why an exception should be made in this instance, and we do
not think the court's applying the term 'reasonably certain' to supposed future conditions meant
any more than this, but that each of them would
have approved an instruction to the effect that
the jury might return damages for future pain
and suIfering if they found by a rpreponderance
of the evidence that such pain and suffering
would ensue. However, the charge of the court
is not without direct authority in its support. In
Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) vol. 1, p. 249,
the author, speaking of prospective losses, after
stating the rule to be that such losses must be
reasonably certain to ensue, uses this language:
'This 'reasonable certainty' does not mean absolute certainty, but reasonable probability'; citing
Griswold v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 115 N. Y.
61, 21 N. E. 726, 12 Am. St. Rep. 775, and Feeney
v. L. I. R. R. Co., 116 N. Y., 375, 22 N. E. 402, 5
L. R. A. 544, where it was held not error to permit answers to questions put to an expert medical
witness conc~rni1_1g the. probability of the injured
party suffering In the future from his injuries.
In Hamilton v. Great Falls S. R. Co., 17 Mont.
334, 42 Pac. 860, 43 Pac. 713, the court oaid : 'The
court charged, among other things, that damages
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could be awarded for 'such consequences as are
reasonably likely to ensue in the future'; and
again, 'plaintiff may recover for all pain and
suffering which she has sustained, or in reasonable probability will hereafter sustain,' etc. The
appellant now contends that damages can only be
awarded when it is rendered reasonably certain
from the evidence that damages will inevitably
and necessarily result from the original injury.
In this case all testimony as to future disability
consisted of expert medical opinions. Certainty
of fut'ttre effects was impossible, and reasonable
probabilities were necessarily the bases of the
opinions expressed. Therefore to say that she
could recover for suffering which she would in
reasonable probability sustain was practically
to say that she might recover for suffering which
she was reasonably certain to sustain. The degree
of proof would be the same in either case.' "
The other cases cited by defendant under this point
of its brief do not involve the giving of instructions
similar to the one here criticized.
In Southwest Brewery Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U. 8.163,
33 S. Ct. 68, the criticism of the instruction had nothing
to do with the lack or presence of the term ''reasonably
certain". The Lindeman case was referred to but the
court only stated that with regard to future pain the
judge did not go beyond the conservative rule laid down
in that case. It cannot be determined just what the
court meant by this statement but there is nothing in
the case which helps us in the determination of the question here discussed.
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In Daigneau v. Grand TTunk Ry. Co., 153 F. 593, a
district judge wrote an o-pinion on a motion for a new
trial wherein he allowed -plaintiff to either accept a
remittitur or he would grant a new trial. He did not
consider im;tructions which should be given to the jury
on this subject.
In Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 S. Ct. 696, the
only question to which the Supreme Court addressed itself was whether or not there could be recovery for
mental suffering.
\Ve submit that under the foregoing authorities no
error was committed by instructing the jury that plaintiff could recover for those damages which he would
probably endure in the future.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO TREATMENT PRESCRIBED
BY DR. HINES.

The plaintiff was permitted to testify that one of
the doctors he consulted directed him to get a belt for
his back (R. 115). Defendant contends that this testimony is hearsay. There is no narrative statement of
any facts contained in this direction of the doctor.
The cases cited by defendant as sustaining its position that this testimony was inadmissible are readily
distinguishable from the case at bar.
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In United States v. J!cCreary, 105 F. (2d) 297, the
statements introduced in evidence were to the effect that
the plaintiff was unable to work; that the doctor didn't
think plaintiff could work because he hadn't been able
to in the past and he could see no reason why he could
in the future; that duodenal ulcers never heal; that the
complaint that worried the doctor was the condition of
plaintiff's heart; and that plaintiff had never been able·
to do a day's work. These statements are nothing like
those which were introduced in evidence here. The
doctor here did not state as to what plaintiff had been
able to do in the past or would be able to do in the future. He merely stated that plaintiff should get a belt
for his back (R. 115).
In Bucher v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 91
Utah 179, 63 P. (2d) 604, the plaintiff introduced in evidence statements made by doctors to him for the purpose of fixing the time when the fact of permanent disability was made known to plaintiff so he could file due
proof of his claim under an insurance policy. The court
determined that this question was not material and
further stated that the statements made by the doctors
were hearsay. The statements there were to the effect
that plaintiff was through and that he was not able to
do anything, etc.
The testimony of plaintiff here criticized related to
the treatment he had sought and obtained for his injuries, the doctors he had consulted concerning his injuries and the things prescribed for their treatment. He
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fied without objection that this doctor gave him some
little pills and said that plaintiff's trouble was all nerves.
He then testified that Dr. Hines examined him and told
him to get a belt for his back.
Plaintiff was under a duty to obtain medical attention. 25 C. J. S. 508, Damages, Section 36. The testimony that he consulted these doctors was admissible
for this purpose. Then, as stated in 25 C. J. S. 800,
Damages, Section 150, it was proper as bearing on the
extent of his injuries to show that he received medical
treatment. Testimony concerning what Dr. Hines prescribed establishes that he received medical treatment
for his injuries.
In Townsend v. Keith, 34 Cal. App. 564, 168 P. 402,
it was held proper for plaintiff to prove that he returned
to a hospital a second time under the direction of his
physician.
\Ve submit that these were mere statements by the
doctors directing the plaintiff what he should do for
his back and they are not in the nature of narrative
statements and are not subject to the objection that they
are hearsay.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO DIRECTIONS GIVEN HIM
BY DEFENDANT'S TRAINMASTER'S CLERK, MERRILL.

Defendant, in its brief at page 3, states that plaintiff went to Pueblo, Colorado, and contacted the claim
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agent of the defendant. In its brief, under Point I, the
defendant takes the position that the plaintiff was the
one who sought defendant's claim agent for the purpose of making a settlen1ent of his case. The record
discloses that plaintiff was sent to the claim agent by
defendant's trainmaster's clerk, l\lr. Merrill. Plaintiff
so testified at R. 107. Defendant's claim agent testified
on behalf of the defendant and stated that he was informed by defendant's trainmaster's office at Salida
that th~ plaintiff was coming to his office (R. 161). In
preparation for this visit the claim agent called the
doctor to determine whether or not plaintiff was physically qualified to work (R. 161).
The foregoing testimony discloses that the trainmaster's clerk certainly was the agent of the defendant
and forwarded the information that plaintiff was coming
to see the claim agent. This testimony was relevant to
show the reason for plaintiff contacting the defendant.
We submit that the testimony of the release from the
board could not possibly have prejudiced defendant in
this case. The record, as quoted by defendant in its brief
on pages 27 and 28, discloses that the effect of the testimony which was eventually obtained through the maze
of questions and objections and comments by the Court
was that plaintiff was sent to Pueblo to see the clain1
agent, Sayger, by the trainmaster's clerk, Mr. Merrill.
Here again the cases cited by defendant have nothing
to do with the problem presented. Both of the cases
cited by defendant involved contract actions and do not
even remotely resemble the case at bar.
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An examination of the record quoted by defendant
discloses that the trial judge in effect ruled with the defendant on its contention that reason for plaintiff's re ·
lease from the board was a conclusion and following the
court's suggestion plaintiff was asked and stated what
took place at his meeting with Merrill. This could not
be error. A mere direction could not be hearsay. There
was no narrative statement of fact.
We submit that there was no prejudicial error in the
rulings of the Court attacked and criticized under Point
VI of defendant's brief.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the injuries which he received and
that the verdict for $4,300.00 is an unassailed determination of the damages suffered by him as a result of his
injuries. There were no errors committed in the trial of
this case and in any event there certainly were no prejudicial errors committed by the· trial court.

Section 104-14-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides as follows :
''The court must in every stage of an action
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or
proceedings which does not affect the substantial rightR of the parties, and no judgment shall
be reversed or affected by reason of such error
or defect."
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and Section 104-39-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides as follows :
''No exception shall be regarded, unless the
decision excepted to is material and prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the party excepting.''
Under the foregoing authorities and arguments the
judgment in this case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
BLA:CK & ROBERTS
WAYNE L. BLACK
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorneys for Respondent
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